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Dynamic Cognitive Control of Irrelevant Sound:  
Increased Task-Engagement Attenuates Semantic Auditory Distraction 
 
Abstract 
 Two experiments investigated reactive top-down cognitive control of the detrimental 
influence of spoken distractors semantically related to visually-presented words presented for 
free recall.  Experiment 1 demonstrated that an increase in focal task-engagement—promoted 
experimentally by reducing the perceptual discriminability of the visual target-words—
eliminated the disruption by such distracters of veridical recall and also attenuated the 
erroneous recall of the distracters. A recall instruction that eliminates the requirement for 
output-monitoring was used in Experiment 2 to investigate whether increased task-
engagement shields against distraction through a change in output-monitoring processes 
(back-end control) or by affecting the processing of the distracters during their presentation 
(front-end control). Rates of erroneous distracter-recall were much greater than in Experiment 
1 but both erroneous distracter-recall and the disruptive effect of distracters on veridical 
recall were still attenuated under reduced target-word discriminability. Taken together, the 
results show that task-engagement is under dynamic strategic control and can be modulated 
to shield against auditory distraction by attenuating distracter-processing at encoding thereby 
preventing distracters from coming to mind at test. 
 
Keywords:  Cognitive Control; Distraction; Semantic Processing; Veridical Recall; 
Erroneous Recall. 
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Attentional selectivity ensures that only a fraction of the mélange of inputs constantly 
bombarding our various senses reaches perceptual awareness in support of efficient goal-
directed behavior. This selection process, however, has to satisfy two opposing requirements: 
engagement with the task-relevant material (focusability) must be balanced against the 
requirement for continuous evaluation of currently irrelevant information such that it can 
compete for, and if necessary win, the control of action, in case that information signals 
potential danger or opportunity (distractibility; e.g., Allport, 1989; Johnston & Strayer, 2001). 
But despite the adaptive advantage of distractibility, the processing of task-irrelevant 
information can disrupt cognitive activity. In these situations, the cognitive system must find 
a way to reduce the impact of the undesired processing of the irrelevant material. Thus, 
selective attention is thought to be a highly dynamic and reactive system that can boost the 
processing of task-relevant stimuli or/and  dampen the processing of potentially distracting 
material depending on the particular task-demands and task-goals (Anderson, 2003; 
Houghton & Tipper, 1996; Hughes & Jones, 2003b; Monsell & Driver, 2000; Sörqvist, 
Stenfelt, & Rönnberg, 2012). 
There is a burgeoning body of work, particularly on auditory distraction, indicating 
that top-down factors such as increased task-engagement in response to high task-difficulty 
(Halin, Marsh, Haga, Holmgren, & Sörqvist, 2014b; Halin, Marsh, Hellman, Hellström, & 
Sörqvist, 2014a; Hughes, Hurlstone, Marsh, Vachon, & Jones, 2013; SanMiguel, Corral, & 
Escera, 2008; Sörqvist et al., 2012), increased motivation (e.g., via monetary incentive; Small 
et al., 2005), high trait-capacity for focal task-engagement (Hughes et al., 2013; Sörqvist et 
al., 2012), and foreknowledge about potential distraction (Hughes et al., 2013; Röer, Bell, & 
Buchner, 2015; Sussman, Winkler, & Schröger, 2003; Vachon, Hughes, & Jones, 2012), 
modulate the balance between focusability and distractibility (Duncan, 1993; Monsell & 
Driver, 2000). In particular, such factors have been found to attenuate distraction by task-
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irrelevant sound (Halin et al., 2014a, 2014b; Hughes et al., 2013; Sörqvist, 2010; Sörqvist et 
al., 2012) either by preventing a shift of attention to the sound (Hughes et al., 2013) or/and by 
weakening background sound processing (Sörqvist et al., 2012). Here, we examine the role of 
top-down cognitive control in the modulation of the focusability-distractibility balance in the 
context of the disruption of free recall by irrelevant sound that is semantically related to the 
memoranda (Beaman, 2004; Bell, Buchner, & Mund, 1998; Marsh, Hughes, & Jones, 2008, 
2009; Neely & LeCompte, 1999). The semantic distraction setting affords a unique 
opportunity to expand the understanding of the precise mechanisms of top-down control of 
distraction because it exhibits two distinct empirical manifestations of distraction: the 
disruption of veridical recall and the erroneous recall of the distracters. In particular, we 
examine the impact of increased focal task-engagement on these two separable components 
of distraction as a means of determining whether cognitive control is realised by constraining 
the access of irrelevant material at the time it is presented (front-end cognitive control) or by 
modulating processes that monitor response-candidates after they are sampled but before they 
are output (back-end cognitive control). 
In the experiments reported here we employ a version of the standard semantic 
auditory distraction paradigm (e.g., Marsh, Hughes et al., 2015; Marsh, Sörqvist, Hodgetts, 
Beaman, & Jones, 2015) wherein participants view visually-presented lists of items (targets; 
e.g., “chair, desk, wardrobe…”) that are members of the same category (e.g., Furniture) and 
are asked to recall them in any order when presented with a “recall” cue. During some trials, 
to-be-ignored spoken words (distracters) are presented—usually concurrently with the 
targets—that are either taken from the same semantic category as the targets (e.g., other 
Furniture; e.g., “table, sofa, bookshelf…”) or from a different semantic category (e.g., 
Professions; “nurse, secretary, carpenter...”). Despite explicit instruction to ignore the 
distracters, and to avoid guessing at recall, the proportion of targets recalled (veridical recall) 
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is lower when the targets and distracters are semantically related compared to when they are 
semantically unrelated (Marsh et al., 2008). Another often-replicated finding within this 
setting is the presence of extra-list intrusions: Distracters that are categorically related to 
targets are erroneously recalled at a rate greater than if those items had not been presented 
(e.g., when targets and distracters are unrelated; Beaman, 2004; Bell et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 
2008; for analogous effects with categories defined phonologically, see Marsh, Vachon, & 
Jones, 2008). This is an example of an intrusion error of a kind frequently observed in 
episodic free recall (e.g., Zaromb, Howard, Dolan, Sirotin, Tully, & Kahana, 2006) but not 
often the direct subject of inquiry. 
Thus, semantic similarity between targets and distracters impairs episodic memory for 
semantically-rich information as manifest in both reduced veridical recall and increased 
erroneous recall. That free recall of words shows this between-sequence semantic similarity 
effect (B-SSSE) differentiates the setting empirically from other irrelevant sound effects 
(such as that found in serial recall wherein items have to be recalled in the order of 
presentation) that are largely insensitive to semantic similarity between target and distracter 
material (e.g., Buchner, Irmen, & Erdfelder, 1996). According to the interference-by-process 
account (Marsh et al., 2008, 2009), the involuntary semantic processing of the sound 
interferes with the semantic-based processes used to perform the recall task. More 
specifically, semantic distracters spread activation in a semantic network and this activation 
must be inhibited to aid the accurate retrieval of the target items and avoid erroneous recall of 
distracters. In this view, the B-SSSE on veridical recall will occur to the extent that the 
semantic distracters have not been successfully inhibited (Marsh, Beaman, Hughes, & Jones, 
2012) and may be due in part also to a spillover of any successful distracter-inhibition to 
target items (Marsh, Sörqvist, et al., 2015). Evidence for distracter-inhibition in this setting 
comes from the finding that when semantically-related distracters on trial n are repeated as 
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visually-presented targets on trial n + 1 fewer of those targets are recalled compared to when 
there is no such cross-trial repetition. This reduction of recall is presumed to reflect the 
legacy of the inhibition applied to the items on trial n (Marsh et al., 2012; Marsh, Sörqvist et 
al., 2015; see also Hughes & Jones, 2003a). In contrast, the B-SSSE on erroneous recall is 
thought to be due to semantic interference at encoding coupled with a breakdown of source 
monitoring (i.e., the ability to monitor whether a particular item originated from a visual or an 
auditory source). 
Further evidence suggesting that auditory distraction more broadly is amenable to top-
down cognitive control comes from studies of individual differences (Hughes et al., 2013; 
Marsh, Sörqvist, et al., 2015; Sörqvist, 2010; Sörqvist et al., 2012). For example, the 
detection of an auditory stimulus in an unattended channel that is personally significant (such 
as one’s own name; e.g., Moray, 1959) is less likely in those with a high capacity for 
inhibition and/or task-goal maintenance (Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001). Likewise, high 
capacity individuals are less susceptible to attentional capture from sound events that deviate 
from the expected pattern of sound stimulation (i.e., the deviation effect; Hughes et al., 2013; 
Sörqvist, 2010) and less susceptible to the B-SSSE, in terms of both disrupted veridical recall 
(Marsh, Sörqvist et al., 2015) and erroneous distracter-recall (Beaman, 2004).  
In the present experiments, we study the extent to which cognitive control of 
distraction is dynamic and reactive to particular focal task-demands. We also capitalize on the 
distinction between the effects of B-SSS on the disruption of veridical recall and on the 
erroneous recall of non-targets as a means of examining in more detail how such dynamic 
cognitive control might be implemented.  
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Experiment 1 
In the present experiments, we examine whether focal-task engagement can be 
increased reactively as a means of shielding against semantic auditory distraction by B-SSS 
during free recall of visually-presented lists. We sought to influence the level of task-
engagement by increasing task-difficulty, specifically, by making it more difficult to 
perceptually identify the target items. In the high task-difficulty condition, each word in the 
to-be-remembered list was made transparent and embedded in static visual noise (for an 
example, see right panel of Figure 1; cf. Hughes et al., 2013; Parmentier, Elford, Escera, 
Andrés, & San Miguel, 2008; Yi, Woodman, Widders, Marois, & Chun, 2004). In the low 
task-difficulty condition each of the words in the to-be-remembered list was presented in the 
usual fashion: clearly in black against a white background (cf. left panel of Figure 1). We 
reasoned that the greater task-difficulty in the degraded condition would promote active focal 
task-engagement as a means of compensating for that increase in difficulty. We predicted that 
such increased engagement will, in turn, attenuate the B-SSSE on veridical and erroneous 
recall, just as the same increase in task-difficulty shields serial recall performance from 
attentional capture by an irrelevant auditory deviant (Hughes et al., 2013) and office-related 
tasks from distraction by irrelevant meaningful speech (compared to quiet; Halin et al., 
2014a, 2014b). The backdrop for this expectation is that increased focal-task difficulty has 
been shown to limit the extent to which background sound is processed, as indexed by event-
related potentials (Sörqvist et al., 2012) and behavioral auditory attentional capture effects 
(Hughes et al., 2013). Given that sound-processing is reduced under increased task-difficulty 
there should, in the present setting, be less (undesired) spread-of-activation in the semantic 
network from which the target-words are retrieved at recall. As a result, it would be expected 
that veridical recall would be less disrupted by the distracters and fewer distracters would be 
erroneously recalled due to their not reaching the threshold for production (see also Muller-
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Gass, Stelmack, & Campbell, 2006; Zhang, Chen, Yuan, Zhang, & He, 2006; Yi et al., 2004). 
However, another possibility—that we go on to address in Experiment 2—is that increased 
task-engagement, rather than constraining the distracters’ access to processing during their 
encoding, exerts its effect through back-end monitoring processes during retrieval. 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two students at the University of Central Lancashire participated 
for an honorarium of £6 each. All were native English speakers and reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing.  
Materials and Design. The experiment was run using E-Prime software. Each 
participant received 36 trials in which they were visually-presented with 15 target words all 
drawn from one semantic category and 15 auditory distracters that were also taken from a 
single semantic category. Auditory distracters were presented synchronously with the targets. 
Therefore, one auditory distracter was presented for each visual target word. Distracters were 
either all drawn from the same category as the targets, or they were all drawn from a different 
category. Targets appeared centrally on the computer screen in black 72-point Times font on 
a white background at a rate of one every 1.5 s (750ms on, 750ms inter-stimulus interval; 
ISI). Distracters were presented over stereo headphones (Sennheiser HD 202) at 65dB(A) and 
at a rate of one every 1.5 s (750ms on, 750ms ISI). The distracters were digitally recorded in 
a male voice at an even-pitch and sampled with a 16-bit resolution at a sampling rate of 44.1 
kHz using Sound Forge 5.  
Thirty words were chosen from each of 36 semantic categories taken from the Van 
Overschelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky (2004) category norms. Fifteen items from odd-ranked 
positions in the category-norm lists (e.g., 1, 3, 5…29) were assigned to the target lists and 
fifteen items from even positions (e.g., 2, 4, 6…30) were distracters. The 36 selected 
categories were first arranged into pairs of unrelated categories (e.g., “Fruit-Carpenter’s 
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Tools”). There were two experimental blocks of 18 trials: 9 related and 9 unrelated. On the 
related trials, the auditory distracters were taken from the same category as the targets. On 
unrelated trials, the distracters were taken from the semantically-unrelated category (e.g., 
“Fruit”) that was paired with the target category (“Carpenter’s Tools”). 
Two versions of the target words were created and saved as bitmap files on the 
computer controlling the presentation of the stimuli. In one set, the words were clearly 
visible, whereas in the second set the words were degraded by adding a visual mask 
comprising static Gaussian visual noise (400%) over the item, and by setting the transparency 
of the noise to 27% using Powerpoint software. For both sets, the word sustained an angle of 
about 2.6o (participants sat at approximately 50 cm from the screen). Figure 1 provides an 
illustration of one of the words from the non-degraded (left panel) and the degraded (right 
panel) sets. 
The presentation order of exemplars within each target and distracter sequence was 
random but identical for each participant. Half the participants received a semantically-
related trial first followed by a semantically-unrelated trial (with trials alternating thereafter 
between related and unrelated). This order was reversed for the other half of participants. 
Categories were assigned such that, across participants, there was an equal likelihood of each 
category being encountered in the unrelated or related condition. 
A manipulation check was first conducted to determine whether degrading the items 
did indeed make stimulus identification more difficult, and it is reported here briefly. Eight 
participants (staff members and students at the University of Gävle) were presented with 
eighteen lists of fifteen category-exemplars in Swedish: 9 lists with non-degraded and 9 lists 
with degraded items (created in exactly the same way as the English items used for the 
experiments proper [reported below]). Presentation of the lists was blocked by perceptual 
discriminability. Each word was presented for 750 ms followed by a blank screen whereby 
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participants were required to write down the item. Pressing the spacebar initiated the 
presentation of each item. The start of a new list was cued after all fifteen category-exemplars 
had been presented. Participants were told to work as fast and as accurately as possible to 
transcribe the words. Each list appeared equally as often at each level of perceptual 
discriminability and whether the perceptual discriminability block came first or second was 
counterbalanced across participants. Participants were given 5 min to transcribe as many 
words as possible. After each block, participants were asked to rate on a 7 point likert scale 
how demanding they found the task (1 not demanding at all...7 extremely demanding). The 
results substantiated the effectiveness of the degradation manipulation. Participants 
transcribed more words in the non-degraded condition (M = 87.88, SE = 5.42) than in the 
degraded condition (M = 73.88, SE = 6.25; t(7) = 8.5, p < .001; CI.95 = 10.1, 17.9). 
Participants' transcription accuracy was high and the number of errors did not differ between 
the two conditions (M = .25, SE = .31, non-degraded; M = .75, SE = .16, degraded; t(7) = 
1.53, p =.17; CI.95 = 1.27, -.27). Moreover, the participants reported that the task was more 
demanding in the degraded condition (M = 3.63, SE = .38) than in the non-degraded 
condition (M = 1.63, SE = .38; t(7) = 6.11, p < .001; CI.95 = 2.77, 1.23). 
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. Participants wore 
headphones throughout the experiment. Participants began by reading standardized 
instructions and they were told specifically that they should ignore the distracter words and 
that they would not be asked anything about them during the experiment. Participants were 
instructed to focus on memorizing the visually presented items. The target words were 
presented one at a time on the computer screen. After all 15 targets had been presented the 
prompt “recall” appeared on the screen. Participants then had to type, in any order, as many 
items as they could remember. Pressing the space-bar initiated presentation of the next list. 
One practice trial (in quiet) was given at the start of the experiment. 
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Results 
Veridical Recall. Responses were scored according to a free recall criterion; an item 
was scored as correct regardless of its position. As can be seen in Figure 2, participants 
produced fewer correct responses in the related condition as compared with the unrelated 
condition in the low task-difficulty condition but this effect was eliminated under high task-
difficulty. 
A 2 (Task Difficulty: High Difficulty vs. Low Difficulty) × 2 (Target-Distracter 
Relation: Related vs. Unrelated) analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a main effect of 
Target-Distracter Relation, F(1, 31) = 21.36, MSE = .001, p < .005, p2 = .41, but no main 
effect of Task Difficulty, F(1, 31) = 2.36, MSE = .003, p = .14, p2 = .07. However, critically, 
there was a significant interaction between these two factors, F(1, 31) = 12.12, MSE = .001, p 
= .002, p2 = .28. A simple effects analysis (LSD) revealed a significant difference between 
unrelated and related speech under low task-difficulty (p < .001; CI.95 = .036, .061), but not 
under high task-difficulty (p = .55, CI.95 = -.015, .027, observed power = .09). It is worth 
highlighting the fact that task-difficulty did not, in and of itself, influence recall accuracy. 
This is of particular value analytically, as it avoids the difficulty that can arise with 
interpreting an interaction when there are differences in baseline performance. 
 Erroneous Recall. A response that matched one of the fifteen items from the even 
positions in the Van Overschelde et al. (2004) norms (that were presented as distracters on 
related trials) was scored as an intrusion, even for the unrelated condition in which those 
items had not been presented, which provides an estimate of baseline erroneous recall 
probability (see Beaman, 2004; Marsh et al., 2008). Figure 3 shows the mean number of 
related-item intrusions for each condition. The number of intrusions was greater in the related 
condition compared to the unrelated condition, but the difference was attenuated under high 
task-difficulty. 
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A 2 (Target-Distracter Relation) × 2 (Task Difficulty) ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of Target-Distracter Relation, F(1, 32) = 33.17, MSE = 8.06, p < .001, p2 = .52, a main effect 
of Task Difficulty, F(1, 32) = 10.72, MSE = 3.67, p = .003, p2 = .26, and a significant 
interaction between these two variables, F(1, 32) = 8.02, MSE = 1.80, p = .008, p2 = .21, 
reflecting the fact that the relatedness effect on intrusions was appreciably smaller under high 
task-difficulty. A simple effects analysis (LSD) showed that the relatedness effect 
nevertheless reached significance regardless of task-difficulty (under low task-difficulty: p < 
.001; CI.95 = 2.19, 4.94; under high task-difficulty: p < .001; CI.95 = 1.396, 3.04). It is 
important to note also that the main effect of task-difficulty was driven for the most part by 
the reduction in the disruptive effect of related speech under high task-difficulty; indeed, 
there was no significant effect of task-difficulty within the unrelated (i.e., effectively 
baseline) condition (p = .18, CI.95 = -.22, 1.09) indicating again that task-difficulty in and of 
itself did not affect the intrusion rate.  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that task-difficulty attenuates—indeed eliminates— 
the B-SSSE on veridical recall and also attenuates the effect on erroneous recall. This finding 
is clearly in accordance with the assumption that background sound is processed to a lesser 
extent when task-engagement is boosted to compensate for increased task-difficulty. Indeed, 
the fact that task-difficulty did not itself affect recall performance—just as it did not affect 
accuracy (only time-taken) in the manipulation-check experiment—but rather only modulated 
the effects on that performance of irrelevant sound, supports the idea of a compensatory shift 
in task-engagement. If task-engagement were not boosted, the level of recall performance 
would be expected to be reduced directly by increased task-difficulty (see, e.g., Eggemeier & 
O’Donnell, 1983). Increased task-engagement, in turn, may result in the suppression of 
activity in the cortical (and subcortical) areas responsible for sound/speech processing 
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(Regenbogen et al., 2012; Sörqvist et al., 2012; see also Halin et al., 2014a, 2014b; Hughes et 
al., 2013).  
Such suppression of irrelevant material at the time it is presented would be an 
example of front-end cognitive control (Halamish, Goldsmith, & Jacoby, 2012; Jacoby, 
Kelley, & McElree, 1999; Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, & Rhodes, 2005; Jacoby, Shimizu, 
Velanova, & Rhodes, 2005; Thomas & McDaniel, 2013). Another possibility, however, is 
that increased task-engagement exerts its effect through back-end monitoring processes 
responsible for ensuring, at retrieval, veridical recall of target items and the rejection of non-
target, distracter, items (i.e., monitoring what enters the recall protocol; Beaman, 
Hanczakowksi, Hodgetts, Marsh, & Jones, 2013; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). In Experiment 
2, therefore, we seek evidence that should help determine which of these two possible 
mechanisms underpins the impact of increased task-engagement on distraction. 
Experiment 2  
 In Experiment 2, we adopt the so-called inclusion test for free recall (e.g., Brainerd & 
Reyna, 1998; Hege & Dodson, 2004) as a way of identifying the locus of the effect of 
increased task-engagement on semantic distraction. The inclusion test requires that 
participants output not only the target items but also any other related items that come to 
mind during test. It is widely assumed that post-access monitoring is a key part of retrieval 
and that semantically-associated, non-presented, items, often come to mind at test but are 
edited prior to retrieval as part of a post-access monitoring process (e.g., Hunt, Smith, & 
Dunlap, 2011). Inclusion tests require that participants disengage the post-access monitoring 
process operating during standard free recall, thereby allowing non-target items—that are 
usually edited in standard free recall—to be output as part of the recall protocol (cf. Hunt et 
al., 2011).   
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 The rationale for introducing the inclusion test into the present setting was as follows. 
If the reduction in erroneous recall of related distracters under high task-difficulty is still 
found, and to a roughly equivalent degree, under inclusion free recall instructions, as it was 
under standard free recall instructions (as used in Experiment 1), then the effect of task-
difficulty most likely operates on encoding processes during study (front-end control). For 
example, the distracters may not gain access to semantic analysis under high task-difficulty 
and hence do not come to mind during the semantically-based retrieval processes operating at 
test. Alternatively, to find that high task-difficulty does not reduce erroneous recall under 
inclusion free recall instructions would favor the view that increased task-engagement has its 
effect via back-end control processes operating at test. For example, the increased level of 
engagement required to encode each to-be-remembered word under degraded visual 
conditions may enrich each visual-item encoding episode such that the source of each item 
that comes to mind at test (visual vs. auditory) is more clearly distinguishable and non-target 
items can, as a result, be edited out more readily. 
 The use of an inclusion criterion also enables us to address whether the impairment of 
veridical recall by B-SSS is attributable to the erroneous recall of distracters. Blocking 
accounts assume that erroneous recall is a determinant of the probability of veridical recall. 
Specifically, in this view, the perseverative erroneous recall of the distracters—which match 
the semantic category, and hence retrieval cue, of to-be-remembered items—directly impairs 
access to the targets (Beaman et al., 2013; cf. Raaijmakers & Jakab, 2012). Under standard 
free recall instructions, the relationship between erroneous and veridical recall is obscured 
because erroneous recalls may be edited out prior to overt output. That is, erroneous recall 
could indeed impair veridical recall but such a relationship may go undetected because the 
rate of would-be but edited-out erroneous recalls is not observable. Inclusion recall 
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instructions allow a means of observing otherwise covert instances of erroneous recall and 
their negative effect, if any, on veridical recall. 
An alternative to the blocking account—the two-mechanism account of the impact of 
B-SSS (Marsh et al., 2008; Marsh, Hughes et al., 2015)—holds that the increase in erroneous 
recall is attributable to the use of a semantic-category cue at retrieval coupled with poor 
source-discrimination (see also Bell et al., 2008). On this account, the impairment of veridical 
recall is therefore unrelated to the effect of B-SSS on erroneous recall. Moreover, this 
account supposes that at least some of the impairment of veridical recall may reflect 
competition from the distracters at the point of presentation, rather than the retrieval of those 
distracters as potential output candidates at test (Marsh, Hughes et al., 2015). 
Thus, in sum, we apply the inclusion criterion (Hege & Dodson, 2004) to free recall to 
investigate, for the first time, whether increased task-engagement reduces semantic auditory 
distraction at a relatively early stage (e.g., the suppression of sound processing at 
presentation) or at a relatively late stage (an editing process at retrieval) or some combination 
of the two. 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two students at the University of Central Lancashire participated 
for an honorarium of £6 each. All were native English speakers and reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and normal hearing. None had taken part in Experiment 1. 
Materials, Design, and Procedure. All other aspects of the method were identical to 
Experiment 1 with the exception that participants were instructed to output any related words 
that came to mind when trying to remember the visually-presented target items. 
Results and Discussion 
Veridical Recall. As can be seen in Figure 4, the ease with which the visually-
presented target items could be perceived again modulated the effect of background speech 
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on veridical recall. Related speech was more distracting than unrelated speech when the 
target-words were easy to perceive, but there was no difference between related and unrelated 
speech when the target-words were difficult to perceive. 
 A 2 (Task Difficulty: High Difficulty vs. Low Difficulty) × 2 (Target-Distracter 
Relation: Related vs. Unrelated) ANOVA revealed a main effect of Target-Distracter 
Relation, F(1, 31) = 35.86, MSE = .001, p < .001, p2 = .54, and Task Difficulty, F(1, 31) = 
14.34, MSE = .001, p = .001, p2 = .32. There was also a significant interaction between these 
two factors, F(1, 31) = 42.54, MSE = .001, p < .001, p2 = .58. A simple effects analysis 
(LSD) revealed a significant difference between unrelated and related speech in the low task 
difficulty condition (p < .001; CI.95 = .047, .077), but not in the high task difficulty condition 
(p = .27, CI.95 = -.022, .006, observed power = .19). As in Experiment 1, task difficulty did 
not directly affect recall as evident from the fact that there was no effect of task-difficulty 
within the unrelated speech condition (p = .8, CI.95 = -.013, .016). 
Erroneous Recall. Figure 5 shows that the attenuating effect of high task-difficulty 
on the B-SSSE on intrusion rate found in Experiment 1 was replicated here under inclusion-
instructions. There was a main effect of Target-Distracter Relation, F(1, 31) = 37.72, MSE = 
76.06, p < .001, p2 = .55, and Task Difficulty, F(1, 31) = 32.45, MSE = 7.63, p < .001, p2 = 
.51, as well as a significant interaction between these two factors, F(1, 31) = 47.98, MSE = 
7.32, p < .001, p2 = .61. A simple effects analysis (LSD) showed that the B-SSSE was 
nevertheless significant regardless of task-difficulty (low task-difficulty: p < .001; CI.95 = 
9.24, 16.32; high task-difficulty: p < .001, CI.95 = 3.13, 9.18). Again, the main effect of task-
difficulty was driven by the impact of this factor on the relatedness effect, as there was no 
effect of task-difficulty within the unrelated condition (p = .32, CI.95 = -.537, 1.599). 
The key finding of Experiment 2 is that the B-SSSE on veridical recall and erroneous 
recall persists even with inclusion recall instructions. Although the magnitude of erroneous 
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recall was much greater in Experiment 2 overall, in comparison with Experiment 1, high task-
difficulty still reduced erroneous recall. One interpretation of this finding is that the effect of 
task-difficulty on erroneous recall acts on encoding processes (front-end control) rather than 
via output monitoring processes (back-end control). If the task-difficulty manipulation had its 
effect via output monitoring processes, the effect should disappear when participants are 
instructed to avoid output monitoring (i.e., instructed to output all words that come to mind at 
test). This is not to say that output monitoring does not contribute at all to the recall pattern 
seen here, only that it seems unable to explain why increased task-difficulty shields against 
distraction. Although speculative, one possibility is that task-difficulty eliminates the direct 
competition from the distracters during study, but still allows a few to appear within the 
consideration-set of possibilities during test, thereby reducing, but not eliminating, erroneous 
recall. To corroborate this speculation, we conducted a cross-experiment analysis. 
Cross-Experiment Analysis.  
Veridical recall. For veridical recall, a 2 (Target-Distracter Relatedness) × 2 (Task-
Difficulty) × 2 (Recall Instruction [or ‘Experiment’]: Standard Free Recall vs. Inclusion Free 
Recall) ANOVA revealed a main effect of Task Difficulty, F(1, 62) = 12.53, MSE = .002, p2 
= .17, and Target-Distracter Relatedness, F(1, 62) = 56.16, MSE = .001, p < .001, p2 = .48, 
but no main effect of Recall Instruction, F(1, 62) = 1.81, MSE = .037, p = .18, p2 = .03. 
There was no interaction between Task difficulty and Recall Instruction, F(1, 62) = 1.09, 
MSE = .002, p = .301, p2 = .02, or between Target-Distracter Relatedness and Recall 
Instruction, F(1, 62) = .82, MSE = .001, p = .37, p2 = .013. There was an interaction between 
Task Difficulty and Target-Distracter Relatedness, F(1, 62) = 42.94, MSE = .001, p < .001, 
p2 = .41. A simple effects analysis (LSD) showed that the B-SSSE was significant for low 
task-difficulty (p < .001; CI.95 = .046, .065) but not for high task-difficulty (p = .26, CI.95 = -
.005, .020, observed power = .201). However, most critically for present purposes, there was 
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no three-way interaction between Task Difficulty, Target-Distracter Relatedness and Recall 
Instruction, F(1, 62) = .64, MSE = .001, p = .43, p2 = .01. 
Erroneous recall. In terms of erroneous recall, a 2 (Target-Distracter Relatedness) × 
2 (Task-Difficulty) × 2 (Recall Instruction: Standard Free Recall vs. Inclusion Free Recall) 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of Target-Distracter Relation, F(1, 62) = 58.11, MSE = 
42.06, p < .001, p2 = .48, and Task Difficulty, F(1, 62) = 42.86, MSE = 5.65, p < .001, p2 = 
.41. There was also, as would be expected in relation to intrusion rate, a main effect of Recall 
Instruction, F(1, 62) = 40.49, MSE = 80.77, p < .001, p2 = .40. There was an interaction 
between Task Difficulty and Recall Instruction, F(1, 62) = 7.92, MSE = 5.65, p = .007, p2 = 
.11, Target-Distracter Relation and Recall Instruction, F(1, 62) = 16.46, MSE = 42.06, p < 
.001, p2 = .21, and Task Difficulty and Target-Distracter Relation, F(1, 62) = 55.71, MSE = 
4.56, p < .001, p2 = .47. Moreover, these two-way interactions were subsumed under a 
significant three-way interaction between Task Difficulty, Target-Distracter Relation and 
Recall Instruction, F(1, 62) = 24.47, MSE = 4.56, p < .001, p2 = .28. 
As can be seen when comparing Figures 3 and 5, the three-way interaction emerged 
because, with inclusion free recall, the difference between unrelated and related speech in the 
non-degraded condition was significantly larger than the difference between unrelated and 
related speech in the degraded condition, in comparison to this difference with standard free 
recall instructions. Most importantly, there was a comparable reduction in erroneous recall 
under both standard recall and inclusion recall instructions when task-difficulty was increased 
through stimulus degradation. Erroneous recalls were more frequent under inclusion 
instructions than under standard instructions—thereby corroborating the effectiveness of the 
instruction manipulation—but this was the case in both the unrelated and related speech 
conditions. This is consistent with the idea that post-access monitoring is generally part of 
retrieval (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998) and that inclusion instructions disengage post-access 
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monitoring, allowing more related intrusions to arise regardless of whether they were 
presented as distracters. If post-access monitoring was responsible for the reduction in the 
recall of distracters under high task-engagement, however, then the effect should disappear 
under inclusion instructions when the post-access monitoring is disengaged. This was not the 
case. Therefore, the shielding effect of increased task-engagement cannot be attributed to 
back-end control. 
The results of Experiment 2 also have implications for understanding the B-SSSE on 
veridical recall. The results are at odds with the blocking approach (Hanczakowski, Beaman, 
& Jones, 2012; Raaijmakers & Jakab, 2012) in which reduced veridical recall is caused by 
erroneous recall of distracter-items that block the retrieval of target items. The finding that 
inclusion recall—that permits erroneous recall—failed to dramatically increase the B-SSSE 
on veridical recall suggests that the B-SSSE on veridical and erroneous recall is not 
attributable to a single, blocking, mechanism (cf. Hanczakowski et al., 2012). However, this 
dissociation between erroneous and veridical recall is consistent with a two-mechanism 
account of the impact of B-SSS (Marsh et al., 2008; Marsh, Hughes et al., 2015) wherein 
erroneous recall is attributed to poor source-discrimination due to the use of the semantic-
category cue that is shared by targets and distracters at retrieval (see also Bell et al., 2008). 
On this account, the impairment of veridical recall is unrelated to the effect of B-SSS on 
erroneous recall, and the impairment may reflect competition from the distracters at the time 
they are presented, rather than the retrieval of those distracters as output candidates at test 
(Marsh, Hughes et al., 2015; Marsh, Sörqvist et al., 2015).  
General Discussion 
 One means by which the cognitive system overcomes unwanted distraction flowing 
from auditory analysis of task-irrelevant stimuli is to increase focal-task engagement. We 
have shown here that this is not restricted to distraction due to attentional capture by 
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unexpected sounds (Hughes et al., 2013) but generalizes to higher-order cognitive processes: 
Greater focal-task engagement (as manipulated through differences in visual-task difficulty in 
this case) decreases semantic distraction. Furthermore, extending considerably beyond other 
recent work on auditory distraction (Halin et al., 2014a, 2014b; Hughes et al., 2013), we have 
been able to show that increased task-engagement exerts its impact via a selection process 
taking place at the point of presentation of distracters rather than later during retrieval 
processes.1  
The Relation Between Veridical and Erroneous Recall 
The results reported here are consistent with the interference-by-process view of 
semantic auditory distraction (Marsh et al., 2008, 2009) in which the B-SSSE on veridical 
recall is a result of a conflict between semantic processes, and the B-SSSE on erroneous 
recall is a result of such conflict and a breakdown of source monitoring (Marsh, Sörqvist et 
al., 2015). Evidence for the independence of the two mechanisms comes, for example, from 
studies showing that the B-SSSE on erroneous recall is attenuated substantially if the 
distracters are presented during a retention interval instead of synchronously with target 
presentation, whereas the B-SSSE on veridical recall is largely unaffected by this (e.g., Marsh 
et al., 2008; Marsh, Sörqvist et al., 2015; Sörqvist, Marsh, & Jahncke, 2010). The 
experiments reported here provide further support for this two-mechanism account as the 
task-difficulty manipulation seems to have different effects on veridical recall and erroneous 
recall: The B-SSSE on veridical recall disappears under high task difficulty whereas the B-
SSSE on erroneous recall is only attenuated. Furthermore, the inclusion recall instructions did 
not eliminate the B-SSSE on veridical recall, even though the instruction drastically increased 
recall of non-target items.  
The independence of erroneous and veridical recall (Beaman, 2004; Marsh et al., 
2008; Marsh, Hughes et al., 2015) further undermines the idea that blocking (Rundus, 1973) 
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is the mechanism that produces the B-SSSE on veridical recall (cf. Hanczakowski et al., 
2012). The blocking account assumes that the erroneous recall of automatically encoded 
distracters prevents the retrieval/production of other items (e.g., targets) typically by seizing 
control of a limited-capacity output buffer (Kimball & Bjork, 2002; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 
1980; Raaijmakers & Jakab, 2012; Rundus, 1973). One prediction from a blocking account 
(Hanczakowski et al., 2012; Rundus, 1973) is that there should be a relation (significant 
negative correlation) between the number of veridical items recalled and the number of 
intrusions of spoken distracters, particularly under inclusion instructions. As recall of spoken 
distracters increases, the recall of targets should decrease, but this is not borne out by the data 
(present study; Beaman, 2004; Marsh et al., 2008; Marsh, Hughes et al., 2015). 
Front-End Control 
An increase in task-difficulty attenuates the effect of background speech on veridical 
recall and—to a lesser degree—on erroneous recall. Our interpretation of this finding is that 
the task-difficulty manipulation reduces processing of the irrelevant material via a front-end 
mechanism such that the B-SSSE on veridical recall is eliminated. However, despite the 
reduction in processing of the irrelevant sound, some distracters are inevitably processed, 
thereby bringing source monitoring ability into play. As a consequence, the effect of B-SSS 
on erroneous recall is attenuated but not eliminated entirely. 
The nature of the front-end mechanism operating to protect against distraction 
remains open for debate. On the interference-by-process account of the B-SSSE, the 
involuntary semantic processing of irrelevant material while attention remains focused on a 
task dominated by semantic-based processes results in a conflict of two concurrent semantic 
processes, thereby impairing free recall (Jones et al., 2012; Marsh et al., 2008). In broad 
terms, the B-SSSE can be seen as an example of distraction due to attentional leakage: 
semantic processing of irrelevant material whilst attention is focused elsewhere (Lachter, 
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Forster, & Ruthruff, 2004).  From this standpoint, increased task-engagement in the face of 
high task-difficulty attenuates that involuntary semantic processing during presentation 
(front-end control); thus, the degree of attentional leakage is not fixed but is to some extent 
under dynamic cognitive control. This leads to preserved veridical recall and a partial 
reduction of the B-SSSE on erroneous recall. However, the question remains as to what 
exactly increased task-engagement entails. One possibility is that it involves a boosting of 
that aspect of the focal task-set involved in the timely perceptual identification of each word 
such that the perceptual features that differentiate target from distracter material (e.g., that the 
targets are visual and the irrelevant stimuli are auditory) are rendered more salient (e.g., Van 
der Heijden, 1981). This boosted task-set may, as a passive side-effect, attenuate the early 
sensory processing of the sound (thereby limiting its semantic analysis; Sörqvist et al., 2012). 
Another possibility is that increased task-engagement does not involve (or only involve) the 
boosting of the focal task-set but (also) involves greater inhibition of the irrelevant material 
(e.g., Tipper, 1985). As noted in the Introduction, we have shown previously that distracters 
are indeed subject to inhibition at presentation: recall is particularly difficult if the items were 
recently presented as distracters (Marsh et al., 2012; Marsh, Sörqvist, et al., 2015). However, 
evidence that inhibition occurs does not necessarily show that increased task-engagement 
entails increased distracter-inhibition. Thus, at present, the data available seem equally 
consistent with a task-set boosting account and an increased-distracter inhibition account of 
how the front-end control of the B-SSSE is implemented. Future studies in which an index of 
inhibition (e.g., negative priming; Marsh et al., 2012) is combined with a manipulation of 
task-difficulty as used here may allow for the determination of whether increased task-
engagement is indeed associated with increased distracter-inhibition; if not, the alternative, 
task-set boosting, account would be favored. 
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A further candidate mechanism for how front-end control might be implemented in 
the present setting is, we believe, more readily discounted. It is possible that some of the 
disruptive effect of semantically-related speech on free recall is due to attentional diversion 
or attentional slippage (Lachter et al., 2004) whereby the distracters draw the focus of 
attention away from the encoding of the target items (e.g., Cowan, 1995). Previous research 
has demonstrated that salient semantic information can indeed capture attention. For 
example, in a shadowing task in which participants continuously repeat aloud a message 
presented to one ear while ignoring another message presented to the other ear, about a third 
of participants hear their own name when it is spoken in the to-be-ignored channel (Conway 
et al., 2001; Moray, 1959; Wood & Cowan, 1995; see also Röer, Bell, & Buchner, 2013). 
Perhaps it is no coincidence, therefore, that participants who score highly on a working 
memory capacity task make fewer intrusions of related spoken distracters in the semantic 
distraction task (Beaman, 2004; Marsh, Sörqvist et al., 2015) and are less likely to make 
shadowing mistakes, or hear their name at the time it is presented in the to-be-ignored 
channel, in the context of dichotic listening (Conway et al., 2001). Therefore, one possibility 
is that the B-SSSE may be due (in part) to both attentional leakage (producing interference-
by-process; Marsh et al., 2008, 2009) and attentional slippage: the allocation of attention, 
perhaps without intention, to the irrelevant items. Attentional slippage in the semantic 
auditory distraction setting may involve the involuntary redirection of attention towards a 
spoken item and then back to the visual targets. Increased task-engagement might serve to 
prevent such slippages of attention to the semantic distracters just as it prevents attentional 
capture by acoustically deviant sounds (Hughes et al., 2013; SanMiguel et al., 2008). 
However, a likely consequence of attentional slippage in the present context is a greater 
analysis of the spoken distracter from which modality information could be encoded and 
thereafter used—if instructed to do so (e.g., via forewarning)—to edit the item post-retrieval. 
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Therefore, intrusions of spoken distracters would be expected to be reduced if attention 
regularly switched from targets to distracters. Given that B-SSS in fact increases erroneous 
recall, the pattern of results is difficult to reconcile with an attentional slippage account. 
 This disaffection with the attentional slippage view is compounded by further 
findings within the semantic distraction literature that the attentional slippage account fails to 
explain. For example, an account based purely on attentional slippage would seem to suggest 
that a B-SSSE should arise for a broad array of tasks. However, this is not the case: If 
participants are required to recall a list in serial order, the B-SSSE disappears (Marsh et al., 
2008, Experiment 3; Marsh et al., 2009; Experiment 3). Moreover, on the attentional slippage 
account, one would also expect recognition to demonstrate a B-SSSE. However, while related 
distracters attract more false alarms within tests of recognition, they do not affect hit rate 
(Hanczakowski et al., 2012). Finally, it would appear that the attentional slippage account 
predicts greater disruption when distracters are presented during the encoding of targets, as 
compared with their retention, and greater disruption when presented during their retention as 
compared with retrieval. Although the incidence of erroneous recalls fits this pattern—
intrusion of distracters decreases as a function of the temporal proximity to the targets—the 
disruption that B-SSS produces to veridical recall does not. Disruption of veridical recall is of 
the same magnitude regardless of whether the distracters are presented during encoding, 
retention, or retrieval phases of the task (Marsh et al., 2008; Marsh, Perham, Sörqvist, & 
Jones, 2014). Therefore, the attentional slippage account is at best an incomplete account of 
the B-SSSE on veridical and erroneous recall. 
The Role of Back-End Control 
 In general, the present results suggest that one effect of increased task-engagement is 
to attenuate the encoding of distracters which in turn makes them less likely to come-to-mind 
at test. However, to some degree such front-end control is most likely supplemented by back-
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end control (e.g., Thomas & McDaniel, 2013). The fact that erroneous recall was higher 
under the lenient inclusion instructions than standard test instructions is consistent with the 
notion that a back-end monitoring process indeed exists to examine accessed memories for 
evidence of their presence in the cued event. One possibility is that in standard free recall the 
process of response-generation at test involves bringing-to-mind the encoding episode: The 
features associated with a covertly retrieved item, such as its modality information, is 
evaluated in terms of whether it can be differentiated as a target or distracter. The item is 
produced (if it matches relevant features of the encoding episode) or is withheld if no match 
occurs. Relaxing the requirement for accuracy, as with inclusion instructions, attenuates the 
monitoring strategy such that related items are accepted, resulting in more erroneous recall 
than under standard conditions. However, at odds with expectations from back-end control is 
that with inclusion instructions—which effectively remove the influence of back-end 
control—the apparent suppression of erroneous recall produced by high task-difficulty did 
not diminish. This suggests that the effect of task-difficulty on erroneous recall is via 
encoding processes (front-end control) rather than monitoring at test (back-end control): if the 
task-difficulty manipulation had its effect via output-monitoring processes, the effect should 
diminish or disappear when participants are instructed to avoid output monitoring.  
Before we can disregard the back-end control explanation of the task-difficulty effect, 
however, it is worth considering the concepts of “relational processing” and “item-specific 
processing” (Arndt & Reder, 2003; Hege & Dodson, 2004). Relational processing refers to 
processing of information shared by all items within an event, such as the shared category-
membership of a list. Item-specific processing involves the processing of information that is 
unique to an item within a list. Study manipulations that affect the balance of relational and 
item-specific processing could have consequences for the processing, and erroneous recall of, 
distracters. In this view, one possibility is that degrading visual stimuli reduces relational 
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processing and enhances item-specific processing thereby reducing processing of the shared 
category-membership between list items. To the extent that category-membership is a key 
retrieval cue—subserving both veridical and erroneous recall—this diminution of the 
representation of category information would lead to less erroneous recall. Consistent with 
this notion, Mulligan (1999) demonstrated that degrading/masking visual stimuli that 
comprised several items taken from different semantic categories during study reduced the 
degree to which those items were recalled by category at test. Typically, this reduction in 
semantic clustering of list-items at test is taken as evidence of reduced relational processing 
during encoding. However, this relational processing-deficit view (Hege & Dodson, 2004) is 
difficult to reconcile with the current findings for a number of reasons. First, impoverished 
relational processing typically reduces veridical recall (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993) yet high 
task-difficulty did not reduce veridical recall in the present experiments. Second, one would 
expect the visual-perceptual manipulation to also reduce erroneous recall of items 
semantically related to the target-words in the unrelated speech condition (i.e., the baseline 
level of erroneous recall should drop) whereas in fact, regardless of task-instruction, this was 
not the case. Third, the finding that inclusion instructions under high, as well as low, task-
difficulty gave rise to increased erroneous recall of distracters indicates that relational 
processing clearly took place under high-task difficulty. Fourth, if item-based distinctive 
processing (processing the differences between items within the global similarity of the list) 
was enhanced, one would expect better veridical recall under high task-difficulty even in the 
unrelated condition (similar to a deep-orienting manipulation; Hunt, 2003; Hunt et al., 2011). 
Again, this did not occur. Therefore, reduced relational processing appears unable to explain 
the failure to access distracters at retrieval (i.e., it is unable to explain why high task-
difficulty reduced erroneous recall even with the inclusion recall criterion). We conclude that 
whereas back-end control is probably operating at recall, front-end control, not back-end 
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control, best explains why the task-difficulty manipulation shields against distraction and 
erroneous recall. 
Greater focal-task engagement, as induced by visual-task difficulty, has been shown 
to reduce the difference in performance between individuals with low and high working 
memory capacity (Halin et al., 2014a; Hughes et al., 2013). Therefore, it is quite informative 
to consider whether the greater focal-task engagement can affect the maintenance of 
information, as well as the processes involved in searching for target material within memory 
(a form of back-end control). If so, then greater focal-task engagement may modulate the 
maintenance and search processes of low-capacity individuals in such a way as to make them 
more comparable to that of high-capacity individuals. According to the model of Unsworth 
and Engle (2007a, 2007b), differences in the processes of maintenance within primary 
memory and controlled search within secondary memory explain the differences in 
performance between individuals with high and low working memory capacity. On their 
approach, primary memory serves to maintain activation of a small number of separate 
representations for ongoing processing. However, this maintenance process requires the 
continuous allocation of attention. The removal of attention results in the displacement from 
primary memory of the representations, leaving only a trace within secondary memory. 
During study, a hierarchy of context cues are encoded including global context cues 
(associated with relatively invariant features including the study environment), contextual 
elements that represent the list, and contextual elements that are associated with each item. 
The latter context changes more rapidly than the list context. According to the model, if there 
is some impedance to the maintenance of primary memory traces, then the task-relevant 
information must be retrieved from secondary memory. However, retrieval from secondary 
memory is cue-dependent, and requires controlled/strategic search to discriminate target from 
distracter information and to reduce competition at retrieval (cf. Capaldi & Neath, 1995).  
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Can Unsworth and Engle’s (2007a) model explain the present results? One way in 
which the model could potentially do so is by assuming that greater task-difficulty enhances 
maintenance of items in primary memory by promoting more effective encoding of fine-
grained contextual information concerning the targets, thereby reducing the B-SSSE on 
veridical recall. However, this would predict that high task-difficulty should improve 
veridical recall and reduce erroneous recalls in the unrelated condition, which did not happen. 
Moreover, the account predicts that minimizing the requirement for accessing contextual cues 
using inclusion instructions as in Experiment 2 should reduce or eliminate the beneficial 
effect of high task-difficulty, which it does not (when distracters are related). Another 
possible means for the model to explain the task-difficulty effect is by assuming that 
distracters no longer interfere because they are not represented within the search set delimited 
for targets. Therefore, increased task-engagement promotes a retrieval environment that 
mimics that of high working memory capacity individuals, whereby few irrelevant 
representations appear in the search sets during recall. This is a plausible account but one 
problem for it is that the dynamics of the model advocate blocking as a mechanism of 
retrieval interference. The model assumes that items are sampled one at a time (serial search) 
from the search set through random sampling with replacement. Therefore, once an item has 
been sampled and recalled it has an equal chance of being sampled again. The probability of 
finding new recoverable target representations is affected by the number of previously 
sampled representations regardless of whether they are target or distracter representations. 
Therefore, the model predicts a negative relationship between veridical and erroneous recall: 
sampling a distracter will have a suppressive effect on the capability of discovering yet-to-be 
recalled target representations. This relationship is not observed (Marsh et al., 2008; Marsh, 
Hughes et al., 2015; present study). It remains possible that independent effects of B-SSS 
could be due to the sampling process, since only after sampling does an item exceed some 
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absolute threshold by which it can be recovered into consciousness (cf. Raaijmakers & 
Shiffrin, 1980). Therefore, a related distracter could have a suppressing effect on a target 
response within the search set prior to its recovery/retrieval. However, this is difficult to 
reconcile with the finding that increased task-engagement eliminated the B-SSSE on veridical 
recall but only reduced the effect on erroneous recall. If anything, the reverse would be 
expected since it would seem that the recovery of distracters should be related to their 
sampling prior to recall, and if sampled they should suppress target items. 
A final back-end control mechanism we consider is response withholding. The 
response withholding interpretation assumes that the B-SSSE within the context of standard 
free recall, as in Experiment 1, is attributable to a conservative report criterion. Specifically, 
in contrast to the unrelated condition wherein distracters can be edited from output on the 
basis of their mismatch with the semantic category from which the targets were drawn, the 
semantic category information cannot be used as a basis for discriminating whether a covertly 
retrieved exemplar was a target or distracter in the related condition. Faced with this 
discrimination, or source confusion, problem, participants may withhold responses, altering 
their report criterion to avoid high intrusion rates (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Therefore, in 
the related condition, a conservative shift in report criterion may result in the withholding of 
targets in addition to distracters. That the B-SSSE was not reduced with inclusion instructions 
rather undermines the view that it is produced by response withholding. Moreover, the 
extension of this view to explain why perceptual degradation of the targets eliminates (in the 
case of veridical recall) and reduces (in the case of erroneous recall) the B-SSSE seems to 
require too many additional gyrations: Perceptual degradation must lead to a more liberal 
shift in report criterion at test that only exerts its effect on targets, since perceptual 
degradation reduced rather than increased erroneous recall of distracters. Therefore, high 
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task-difficulty does not appear to modulate the B-SSSE through differences in report 
strategies.  
 
Conclusions 
In sum, the results reported here suggest that increased task-engagement can shield 
against the disruptive effects of between-sequence semantic similarity on veridical and 
erroneous recall. Here, we have again shown that these two effects are dissociable: Top-down 
cognitive control modulates both the veridical and erroneous recall components but whereas 
the effect on the veridical recall component is eliminated entirely by increased task-
engagement, the erroneous recall component is only reduced. This suggests that erroneous 
recall does not just depend on the level of irrelevant sound processing—which can be 
modulated by increased task-engagement—but also on some other process (e.g., source 
monitoring) that is not so modulated. We have also reviewed several possible candidate 
mechanisms by which veridical recall is impaired by B-SSS and how this impairment is 
eliminated by increased task-engagement. The available data from both the present study and 
previous work leads us to favor a front-end control account in which increased task-
engagement may be understood either in terms of the boosting of the focal task-set, resulting 
in a passive attenuation of irrelevant sound processing, or the accentuation of an active 
distracter-inhibition process. Further research will be required to adjudicate between these 
two possibilities. 
It is worth noting in closing that the shielding effect of increased task-engagement 
against distraction may have applied as well as the theoretical implications that we have 
emphasized here: We have now shown that it extends to a variety of applied tasks (proof-
reading; Halin et al., 2014a; text memory; Halin et al., 2014b) and to a variety of sound-types 
including acoustically deviant sounds (Hughes et al., 2013) and meaningful speech (present 
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study; Halin et al., 2014a; 2014b). Whilst no doubt counterintuitive, degrading visual stimuli 
may have value as a practical intervention for individuals with poor attentional control such 
as those with cognitive deficits characterising schizophrenia (Cellard, Tremblay, Lehoux, & 
Roy, 2007), normal ageing (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988), dementia of the Azheimer’s type 
(Levinoff, Li, Murtha, & Cherktow, 2004) and attentional deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(Pelletier, Hodgetts, Lafluer, Vincent, & Tremblay, 2013).   
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Footnotes 
1. It is worth noting that, at first glance, this front-end control account would seem to be 
in line with the load theory of attention in which high focal-task perceptual load 
usurps resources required for task-irrelevant processing and thereby reduces 
distraction (Lavie, 2005). However, according to load theory, the kind of 
manipulation used here—perceptual degradation—does not qualify as an increase in 
perceptual load but rather of sensory load which, according to the theory, should 
accentuate distraction (Lavie & DeFockert, 2003). Thus, load theory does not in fact 
appear to provide a useful framework for interpreting the present findings (see also 
Hughes, 2014).   
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Illustration of how one of the target words appeared in the low task-difficulty and 
high task-difficulty conditions. Note: All target stimuli in a given set were either all clearly 
visible (low task-difficulty condition) or visually degraded (high task-difficulty condition). 
 
Figure 2. Mean veridical recall of visually-presented items that are either masked by visual 
noise (degraded condition) or not masked by visual noise (non-degraded condition) in 
Experiment 1. Background speech was either semantically related to the target items or 
unrelated to the target items. Standard free recall instructions where used. Error bars 
represent standard error of means. 
 
Figure 3. Mean erroneous recall in Experiment 1. An item in the recall protocol was scored as 
an intrusion when it was not part of the target set. Standard free recall instructions where 
used. Error bars represent standard error of means. 
 
Figure 4. Mean veridical recall of visually-presented items that are either masked by visual 
noise (degraded condition) or not masked by visual noise (non-degraded condition) in 
Experiment 2. Background speech was either semantically related to the to-be-recalled items 
or unrelated to the target items. Inclusion free recall instructions where used. Error bars 
represent standard error of means. 
 
Figure 5. Mean erroneous recall in Experiment 2. An item in the recall protocol was scored as 
an intrusion when it was not part of the target set. Inclusion free recall instructions where 
used. Error bars represent standard error of means.  
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 4. 
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Figure 5. 
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